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PACE V. SWERDLOW: CAN EXPERT WITNESSES FACE

LIABILITY FOR CHANGING THEIR MINDS? THE TENTH
CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON THE ELEMENT OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE IN A CLAIM OF EXPERT NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION

Expert witnesses are a necessary component of the legal system because many claims involve technical facts that would be beyond the understanding of judges and juries without expert testimony.1 Expert witnesses are also pervasive throughout the legal system.2 For example, a
"recent survey of California civil jury trials determined that at least one
expert testified in eighty-six percent of all cases, with two or more opposing experts testifying in fifty-seven percent of the trials. 3 Courts,
motivated by a desire to obtain objective expert testimony, have historically held experts immune from liability based on their activities as experts.4 However, expert negligence has increasingly become a problem. 5
Thus, courts have recently begun to erode expert immunity and allow
claims against experts for alleged negligence-this trend is particularly
true regarding so-called "friendly" experts (experts subjected to suits
instigated by the same party that retained them).6
Liability for friendly expert negligence is sometimes referred to as
7 However, it remains
the "Pottery Barn Rule": you break it, you buy it.
unclear what exactly a friendly expert must do to "break" a case. This is
because friendly expert negligence is a relatively nascent cause-of-action
whose precedent is still "developing, unsettled, lacking in uniformity,

1.
Eric G. Jensen, When "Hired Guns" Backfire: The Witness Immunity Doctrine and the
Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L. REv. 185, 186-87 (1993); see also Steven Lubet, Expert
Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 465 (1999); Leslie R. Masterson, Witness Immunity or Malpractice Liability for Professionals Hired as Experts?, 17 REv.

LrrIG. 393, 395 (1998).
2.
Mary Virginia Moore, Gary G. Johnson & Deborah F. Beard, Liability in Litigation Support and Courtroom Testimony: Is it Time to Rethink the Risks?, 9 J. LEGAL ECON. 53, 54 (1999);
see also Jensen, supra note 1, at 186-87.

3.

Lubet, supra note 1, at 465.

4.
Andrew Jurs, The Rationalefor Expert Witness Immunity or Liability Exposure and Case
Law Since Briscoe: Reasserting Immunity Protectionfor Friendly Expert Witnesses, 38 U. MEM. L.
REv. 49, 51-52 (2007); see also Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming
"HiredGuns", 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 497-98 (1996).

5.
Moore, Johnson & Beard, supra note 2, at 55.
6.
Hanson, supra note 4, at 499 ("Six states have decided recent cases involving lawsuits
against [friendly] expert witnesses. Four of these six states have held [friendly] expert witnesses
accountable for their actions and have narrowly construed the protection of witness immunity."
(footnote omitted)); see also Jurs, supra note 4, at 63.
7.

Jurs, supra note 4, at 51.
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and, in many jurisdictions, nonexistent., 8 Consequently, there is little
consensus regarding the elemental requirements necessary to establish a
claim for friendly expert negligence. 9 However, synthesis of the minor
amount of existing case law reveals that such a claim is generally based
upon principles of professional negligence, tort liability, and breach of
contract.10
Generally, to establish a prima facie claim of friendly expert negligence the plaintiff must allege: (1) that the plaintiff was a person to
whom the expert owed a duty of care or with whom there was privity, (2)
the applicable standard of care or contract for services, (3) that the witness breached the standard of care or breached the contract, (4) that the
conduct of the defendant in failing to use the appropriate standard of care
or in breaching the contract was a proximate cause of the injury or damage of which the plaintiff complains (injury or damage in the context of
friendly expert negligence most often occurs in the form of an adverse
result at a hearing or trial for the party that retained the expert), and (5)
that witness immunity does not apply to the facts and circumstances of
the case in the plaintiff's jurisdiction."
Of the elements, proximate cause is one of the most difficult to establish. 12 Much of the difficulty surrounding proximate cause arises out
of the discrepancy between the legally prescribed role of experts as objective translators of technical facts, and the actual (or at least perceived)
role of many friendly experts as advocates for the party that retained
them. 13 While plaintiffs may feel it is the duty of their well-paid friendly
experts to testify in an expected manner and to effectively persuade on
their behalf, no liability exists for friendly experts who simply fail to
"deliver" an expected opinion, or to persuade a judge or jury. 14 Thus, for
8.

Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action for Negligence or Malpractice of Expert

Witnesses, 17 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 263 (2008).
9.

See id.

10.
11.

See id.
Id.

12.

MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON, CAROL KRAFKA & JOE S. CECIL, EXPERT TESTIMONY IN

FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 4 (2000), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/ExpTesti.pdf/$file/ExpTesti.pdf (citing a survey of federal civil trials, which found that
expert testimony was needed to establish causation and damages in 64% of trials versus the reasonableness of the party's action (34%), and the standard of care owed by a professional (25%)).
13.
See Lubet, supra note 1, at 467 ("The single most important obligation of an expert witness is to approach every question with independence and objectivity."). But see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 257 (2001) (describing that, in reality, experts "are paid to be
'effective,' but not necessarily to be nonpartisan or even honest"); JOHNSON, KRAFKA & CECIL,
supra note 12, at 6 (citing a survey of federal judges and attorneys who ranked "experts abandon
objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired them" as the most significant problem with
expert testimony in federal civil trials).
14.
See, e.g., Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 860 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("'A witness
has a duty to appear and testify truthfully concerning his knowledge or belief.' [A Party] may not
turn that principle to support their argument that they had a fight to expect that [their expert] would
testify as to what [the party] regarded to be the truth, and that his failure to do so constituted a breach
of contract. Fundamentally, no witness can be required to testify... to anything other than the truth
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each claim of friendly expert negligence, a court must inquire as to
whether the alleged negligence arises out of the expert's objective or
contractual duties, or whether the complaint stems merely from the expert's effectiveness as an advocate. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
15
engaged in this type of inquiry in the recent case of Pace v. Swerdlow.
In Pace, the Tenth Circuit held that a change of opinion by a friendly expert, on the eve of a summary judgment hearing, was not, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of proximate cause in a negligence claim
against the expert. 16 The Tenth Circuit reached its decision in Pace, in
part, because facts existed to suggest that the expert's change of opinion
was ill-timed and grounded in fear and intimidation rather than compelling new evidence that had come to light. 17
Part I of this Comment provides a broad look at the issues and significant cases involving expert witness liability and immunity. Part II
recounts the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pace. Part II analyzes Pace and
offers guidance for future courts in analyzing causation in claims of
friendly expert negligence involving a change of opinion by the expert.
I. BACKGROUND

A. History and Expansion of the Doctrine of Expert Immunity
The Tenth Circuit avoided directly addressing the issue of expert
immunity in Pace. Nonetheless, many of the policy implications underlying expert immunity permeate the majority opinion in Pace, as well as
Judge Gorsuch's partial concurrence and partial dissent. Thus, a brief
review of the doctrine of expert immunity is beneficial before evaluating
Pace.
Expert immunity was born out of general witness immunity.' 8 The
touchstone authority concerning witness immunity is the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Briscoe v. LaHue.19 In Briscoe, the Court granted
absolute immunity to fact witnesses in criminal trials--even in the event
of perjury. 20 In general, state and federal courts have interpreted Briscoe
broadly and have expanded immunity to include additional witness cateas he sees it .... The same is expected of expert witnesses. While [the party] may have expected
[their expert] would testify in accordance with his previous statements to them . . . that did not
change his paramount obligation to speak the truth.").
519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008).
15.
16. Id. at 1074; see also id. at 1075 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17. See id. at 1075 (majority opinion) ("Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant's
change of position, as well as the timing of that change of position, proximately caused the state
court's grant of summary judgment ....")(emphasis added); see also id.at 1076 ("Dr. Swerdlow
changed his opinion we are encouraged to surmise, because he feared counsel's 'meanness' and
threat to attack Dr. Swerdlow's medical license.") (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in

part).
18.
19.
20.

Jurs, supra note 4, at 51-52 (describing the expansion of witness immunity).
460 U.S. 325 (1983).
Id. at 345-46.
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gories such as: fact witnesses for their pretrial statements, expert witnesses against suits instigated by the adverse party ("hostile" experts),
expert witnesses appointed by the court, and expert witnesses retained by
all parties.2 '
The rationale underlying the expansion of immunity generally consists of two major policy considerations: (1) that imposing witness liability may result in witness self-censorship, which in turn could threaten
the fact-finding (and truth-finding) abilities of judges and juries, and (2)
that witness testimony already contains sufficient checks in the form of
the oath to tell the truth, the threat of perjury, the oversight of the trial
judge, and, perhaps most importantly, the process of cross-examination.2 2
However, despite these policy considerations, granting witness immunity, particularly expert immunity, is not without problems. The next subsection details some of these problems.
B. The Problem of "Hired Guns"
In addition to immunity, experts are additionally protected by the
general absence of any binding standards regulating the quality or truthfulness of their testimony. 23 As a result, expert witnesses are often regarded as "mercenaries, hired guns, or as witnesses whose opinions are
for sale to the highest bidder," 24 and their testimony is often viewed with
distrust by judges and juries.25 Skepticism surrounding expert testimony
also stems from the economic reality that experts, unlike ordinary witnesses, are engaged in a voluntary-and often very lucrativecommercial undertaking where market forces influence the type of testimony provided. 26 Professor Jeffrey Harrison summarizes the problem as
follows:
Unlike virtually any other business, expert witnesses are not typically held accountable in either tort or contract law for their commercial activities. This means that many are inclined to deliver what the
market demands-partisan, biased, or plainly dishonest testimonywithout concern for the costs this testimony may impose on others.

21.
Jurs, supra note 4, at 55-60.
22.
See, e.g., Jurs, supra note 4, at 56 (analyzing the rationale of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals).
23.

See Lubet, supra note 1, at 465-67.

24.

Masterson, supra note 1, at 395.

25.
Harrison, supra note 13, at 256; see also Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 1113, 1114 (1991). However, despite growing distrust in the objectivity of expert testimony,

there is evidence indicating that expert testimony nonetheless remains significant in determining the
outcome of trials. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 188 (citing studies showing that seventy-one percent
of polled jurors in criminal trials felt expert testimony made a difference in the verdict, and additional studies finding that thirty-six percent of polled jurors in civil trials felt expert testimony "greatly"
influenced the verdict, while only thirteen percent felt the expert testimony made no difference).
26.

Harrison, supranote 13, at 314.
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This immunity from the internalization of the social cost of their27testimony is hard to reconcile with any moral or economic standard.
The combination of immunity and minimal regulation has resulted
in a lack of quality-control regarding expert testimony. Additionally,
many experts are expected-and paid-to be persuasive advocates for
the party that retains them.2 8 Indeed, empirical studies confirm that attorneys shop for experts who are good salespersons as well as technically
proficient.29 In response to this problem, many courts have begun to
erode--or at least refuse to expand-expert immunity. 30 This is especially true regarding friendly experts because courts, in general, have
found the underlying policy arguments for shielding friendly experts less
persuasive than those for shielding hostile experts.3'
C. Reluctance to Expand Immunity to FriendlyExperts
Six years after Briscoe, in Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assoc. Engineers, Inc.,32 the Washington Supreme Court-broadly interpreting Briscoe and its progeny-became the first court in the country to extend immunity to friendly experts.33 However, since Bruce, nearly every court
that has examined the issue has denied immunity to friendly experts.3 4
The general rationale supported by courts rejecting immunity for
friendly experts was articulated by the California Court of Appeals in the
case of Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co., where the court presented
four principal reasons for denying friendly experts immunity: (1) granting immunity to friendly experts does not encourage them to testify
truthfully, but instead has the opposite effect by shielding negligent experts from liability; (2) prior case law suggests that witness immunity
exists to protect adverse witnesses from suit by opposing parties after a
lawsuit ends, not to protect one's own experts; (3) a claim against a
friendly expert is analogous to a malpractice claim against a party's attorney after a lawsuit, therefore, if witness immunity applied in its
broadest interpretation, attorneys would also be shielded, a notion that no
court would embrace; and (4) many of the judicial system's guarantees
of truthful testimony (e.g. cross-examination) only logically apply to
hostile witnesses.35

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 253.
Id. at 257; see also Jensen, supra note 1, at 188-89; Lubet, supra note 1, at 468.
Harrison, supra note 13, at 262.
See Jurs, supra note 4, at 52.
Id.; see also Hansen, supra note 4, at 499-500.
776 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1989).
Jurs, supra note 4, at 52.
Id.
Id. at 67-69 (summarizing the rationale of the Califomia Court of Appeals in Mattco).
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36

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
Angie Putnam died following her breast augmentation surgery at the
Intermountain Health Center ("IHC") in Salt Lake City, Utah. 37 After
Putnam's death, her parents and heirs, Thomas A. Pace and Karol Pace,
filed a medical malpractice suit in Utah state court against Putnam's doctors. 38 The principal defendant in the suit was Putnam's attending anesthesiologist, Dr. Steven Shuput. 39 Dr. Shuput discharged Putnam after
her surgery despite allegations that "she was having difficulty breathing
and was experiencing pain of nine on a scale of ten.' '4° Putnam died the
night of her release; the exact cause of her death was never determined.41
Dr. Barry N. Swerdlow, a licensed anesthesiologist, contacted the
Paces' lawyer and offered his services as an expert witness.4 2 The Paces
retained Swerdlow as their expert and provided him with Putnam's medical records.43 After reviewing the records, Swerdlow's opinion was
recorded in an affidavit, which stated that "based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr. Shuput and 1HC Surgical Center did
breach the appropriate standard of care when releasing Angela Putnam
Further, Swerdlow suggested that inunder the circumstances ....
stead of being discharged, Putnam should have been transferred to a
nearby hospital for overnight observation, and that pursuant to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, "if she had been monitored overnight, it
is very likely that she would be alive today. ' '4 The affidavit also concluded that "as a direct and proximate result of her premature discharge,
Putnam died."46
"44

After recording Swerdlow's affidavit, the Paces' lawyer wrote a letter to Swerdlow requesting that he review Dr. Shuput's written discovery
responses which detailed Dr. Shuput's reasons for discharging Putnam.47
Swerdlow did not ask to alter his own affidavit after reviewing Dr. Shu-

36.
37.

519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1068.

38.

Id.

Id. at 1069 n.1.
39.
40. Id. at 1068.
41.
d; see also Pace v. Swerdlow, No. 2:06CV27DAK, 2006 WL 5778247, at *1 (D. Utah
May 23, 2006).
42. Pace,519 F.3d at 1068-69.
43.
Id. at 1069.
Id. (quoting Appellate Brief, Exhibit A, at 2, 5, Pace v. Swerdlow 519 F.3d 1067 (10th
44.
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4157)).
45.
Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 3 15, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)). This statement was a handwritten correction by Swerdlow to the original sentence composed by the Paces'
lawyer that read: "If she had been monitored overnight, she would be alive today." Id.
46. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 4 18 Pace,519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
Id.
47.
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provided Swerput's comments. 48 In addition, the Paces' lawyer also
49
dlow with a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition transcript.
Despite his strong support for the Paces' claim in his affidavit,
Swerdlow was not a strong witness for the Paces at his deposition by Dr.
Shuput's counsel.5 ° When asked whether he felt it was ethical to testify
against another anesthesiologist without first reviewing that person's
deposition, Swerdlow responded, "I think it would have been good for
me to have seen it, and I did not ask for it. I did not think to ask for it.
And I wouldn't comment upon the ethics thereof., 51 Swerdlow also
stated that he had never testified in trial, and that he was "a relative novice at this whole thing., 52 As to causation, Swerdlow testified that he
could not say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Putnam would be alive if she had been hospitalized, only that she would
have had an increased probability of survival.53 Swerdlow concluded
that his "ultimate opinion here is that discharging this patient with severity of pain, as documented in the PACU [Post Anesthesia Care Unit]
record, was not something that a prudent physician in Dr. Shuput's situation should have done." 54 However, Swerdlow also admitted that "Dr.
Shuput was not required under the standard of care to read [Putnam's]
pain score," and that if Dr. Shuput "was reassured that [Putnam's] pain
was moderate, reasonable, then he doesn't need to look at [her pain
score], 55 and "would not have breached the standard of care ' 56 if he felt
Putnam was not at that level of pain severity.
Following his deposition, Swerdlow called the Paces' lawyer and
complained that Dr. Shuput's counsel was "mean" and had threatened to
Swerdlow
report him to the American Society of Anesthesiologists.
also stated that "he did not want problems with his license. 58 Swerdlow59
then asked the Paces' lawyer for a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition.
The Paces' lawyer provided a copy, as well as copies of the depositions
of two IHC nurses. 6° After receiving these documents, Swerdlow cut off
contact with the Paces and their lawyer and-without consulting either
the Paces or their lawyer--composed an addendum to his original affida48. Id.
49. Id. Swerdlow claimed he did not receive a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition transcript
until after his own deposition by Dr. Shuput's counsel; however, because the case came to the Tenth
Circuit as an appeal of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court construed the
facts in the light most favorable to the Paces. Id. n.2.
50. Id. at 1069.
51.
Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 57, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
52. Id. at 1069-70 (quoting Appellate Brief at 55, 65, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
53. Id. at 1070.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 58-59, Pace,519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
56. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 62, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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vit in which he directly reversed his support of the Paces' claim, and
instead supported Dr. Shuput's defense.61 Specifically, Swerdlow stated
that it was now his opinion that "Dr. Shuput's care of Ms. Putnam-and
specifically his decision to discharge her from the Intermountain Surgery
Center . . . -was within the standard of care. ' 62 Swerdlow simultaneously faxed his addendum to both the Paces' lawyer and Dr. Shuput's
counsel-again without first consulting the Paces or their lawyer-on the
eve of the summary judgment hearing, which Dr. Shuput had filed a motion for days earlier.63
With the summary judgment hearing only a day away, the Paces attempted to contact Swerdlow about his change of position, but were unable to do so.64 The Paces also sent a letter to Swerdlow demanding that
he repair the damage he had done to their case. 65 At the summary judgment hearing, the Paces were granted a brief continuance. 66 When Swerdlow remained uncooperative, the Paces moved for another continuance,
withdrew Swerdlow as their expert, and filed a motion to designate a
new expert witness. 67 The Paces did not file a memorandum opposing
Dr. Shuput's motion for summary judgment. 68 The state court denied the
Paces' motions and granted summary judgment to Dr. Shuput.69
The Paces did not appeal the decision, and instead commenced a
suit against Swerdlow, again in Utah state court, alleging that his abrupt
change of position on the eve of the summary judgment hearing caused
the dismissal of their underlying malpractice suit against Dr. Shuput.7 °
Specifically, the Paces alleged seven separate claims: (1) professional
malpractice, (2) fraud, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and (7) negligent infliction of emotional
distress.71
Swerdlow, a California resident, removed the case to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing three grounds for dismissal: (1) that the doctrine of expert immunity barred the Paces from bringing any suit against
him, (2) that all seven of the Paces' claims collectively failed as a matter
of law for lack of proximate cause because his modified testimony was
not the sole or primary reason for dismissal of their underlying case, and
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 1071 (quoting Appellate Brief at 71-72, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
Id.

64.

Id.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

71.

Id.
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(3) that each of the Paces' seven claims failed individually as a matter of
law on independent grounds.72
The Federal District Court for the District of Utah granted Swerdlow's motion to dismiss on all seven claims, holding that his change of
opinion was not the proximate cause for dismissal of the Paces' underlying malpractice case.73 The district court explained that even without his
addendum, Swerdlow's original affidavit was not convincing enough to
withstand summary judgment because it contained conflicting testimony
concerning proximate cause.74 Specifically, the district court concluded
that Swerdlow's statements-"if she had been monitored overnight, it is
very likely that she would be alive today," and "as a direct and proximate
result of her premature discharge, Putnam died"-contradicted each other and were fatal to the Paces' suit before the addendum.
The district court also found that the Paces' failure to oppose the
motion for summary judgment contributed as much as anything to the
state court granting summary judgment to Dr. Shuput.7 5 The district
court declined to rule on the controversial issue of friendly expert immunity because it presented an issue of first impression under Utah law,
and because the lack of proximate cause was dispositive as a matter of
law to each of the Paces' claims, rendering a decision on immunity un76
necessary.
B. Decision
1. Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the district court, holding (1) that given the procedural posture of the case as an
appeal of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court had improperly
drawn critical inferences against the Paces, and (2) that the Paces had
alleged facts that, if proven, would be sufficient to establish the element
of proximate cause in their case against Swerdlow.7 7
Judge Briscoe, writing for the majority, began by explaining the
two-part procedural lens that is employed when considering a dismissal
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): the court must (1) "accept all the wellpleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff' 78; and (2) "look to the specific
allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support
72. Id. at 1068, 1071-72.
73. Id. at 1072.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. (quoting Pace v. Swerdlow, 2006 WL 5778247, at *34 (D. Utah May 23, 2006),
rev'd, 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1073.
78. Id. (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
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a legal claim for relief."79 Given this procedural lens, the court determined that the district court improperly concluded that the two statements in Swerdlow's affidavit addressing causation-the statements, "if
she had been monitored overnight, it is very likely that she would be
alive today," and "as a direct and proximate result of her premature discharge, Putnam died"-were in conflict.8 ° Instead, the court concluded
that the phrase "very likely" denoted a high degree of probability, and
thus was perfectly consistent with the later statement concerning proximate cause. 8 '
The court also held that the Paces had alleged facts that, if proven,
would be sufficient to establish the element of proximate cause in their
case against Swerdlow.82 The court began this portion of its analysis by
reviewing the element of proximate cause under Utah law:
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury." 83 Further, there can be more than one
as each is a concurrent contriproximate cause of an injury so long
84
buting factor in causing the injury.
Under such a standard, the court concluded that Swerdlow's original
affidavit would almost certainly have enabled the Paces to survive Dr.
Shuput's motion for summary judgment. 85 Additionally, the court noted
the fact that under Utah law, "it is well established that the question of
proximate cause is generally reserved for the jury," and "only in rare
cases may a trial judge rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate
causation. 86
The court also noted that under Utah's proximate cause standard,
the Paces were not required to allege facts demonstrating that Swerdlow's change of opinion was the proximate cause of the state court's
decision to dismiss their underlying malpractice claim against Dr. Shuput, but only that Swerdlow's change of opinion was a proximate cause
of that decision; that is, that Swerdlow's change of opinion was a "con-

79. Id. (quoting Alvarado, 493 F.3d 1210 at 1215).
80. Id.
81.
Id. at 1074.
82. Id. at 1073.
83. Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
84. Id. at 1073-74 (citing Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467
P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963)).
Id. at 1074. On this point, the court highlighted the fact that "[tiellingly, Dr. Shuput did
85.
not view the affidavit as being weak. Rather in his motion for summary judgment filed in the medical malpractice action, Dr. Shuput's proximate cause argument relied upon [Swerdlow's] deposition
testimony-not [Swerdlow's] affidavit." Id
Id. (quoting Steffensen, 820 P.2d 482 at 486).
86.
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current
contributing factor" to the state court's decision to dismiss their
7
suit.1
The court also rejected the district court's conclusion that the Paces'
failure to file a memorandum in opposition of Dr. Shuput's motion for
summary judgment contributed as much as anything to the dismissal of
their case.88 Under Utah law, expert testimony is required to establish
causation in all medical malpractice cases where the cause of death is not
obvious. 89 Thus, the court concluded that the Paces' omission was irrelevant because at that point-i.e. following Swerdlow's change of opinion-they were without an expert witness, and only a day away from
the summary judgment hearing.90
Ultimately, the court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.9' The court stated that, on
remand, the district court was free to examine the additional questions
raised by Swerdlow's defense, such as whether each of the Paces' claims
failed independently on other grounds, or whether the Paces' claims were
collectively barred by immunity, including whether the latter question
should be certified to the Utah Supreme Court.92
2. Judge Gorsuch's Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent
Judge Gorsuch authored a partial concurrence and partial dissent to
the majority's opinion. 93 As a preliminary matter, Judge Gorsuch concurred with the majority's analysis of the proximate cause issue, including the majority's conclusion that Swerdlow did not demonstrate, as a
matter of law, that his initial affidavit was so weak or contradictory that
it would have necessarily failed to defeat summary judgment in the Paces' underlying malpractice suit. 94 However, Judge Gorsuch recounted
the fact that the court was free to affirm the verdict of the district court
on any ground supported by the record, and stated that the case should
not have been decided on the issue of proximate cause because a review

87. See id.
88.
Id.
89. Pace v. Swerdlow, No. 2:06CV27DAK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32718, at *10 (D. Utah
May 22, 2006).
90.
Pace, 519 F.3d at 1075.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. Swerdlow did in fact bring his case again in the federal district court as a motion to
dismiss based on witness immunity or, alternatively, that the issue of witness immunity should be
certified to the Utah Supreme Court. The federal district court denied Swerdlow's motion to dismiss
based on witness immunity, but granted his motion to certify the issue of witness immunity to the
Utah Supreme Court (Order of the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, Nov. 14, 2008,
available on PACER). However, before the Utah Supreme Court ruled on the certification issue, the
parties settled.
93. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1075.
94.
Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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of the Paces' complaint revealed several other grounds upon which to
affirm the decision of the district court.9 5
Judge Gorsuch also expressed concern about the policy implications
of the majority's decision: "[a]llowing this claim to march along sends
the message to would-be expert witnesses: [b]e wary-very wary-of
changing your mind, even when doing so might be consistent with, or
compelled by, the standards of your profession. 9 6 Additionally, Judge
Gorsuch took issue with the fact that the Paces had never demonstrated
that "another expert, provided with all the information available to Swerdlow at the time he changed his opinion, still would've thought Dr. Shuput engaged in malpractice," 97 and thus concluded that there existed "no
facts suggesting that any responsible physician, after reviewing the full
record, would've thought Dr. Shuput's conduct constituted malprac,,98
tice.
Judge Gorsuch further noted that the Paces themselves stated that
the reason for their dissatisfaction with Swerdlow was his failure to "deliver" the expert testimony he had promised them all along, 99 and warned
of the potential fall-out from creating a precedent that encourages expert
witnesses to "deliver" testimony as opposed to presenting their unbiased
opinions:
Parties already exert substantial influence over expert witnesses,
often paying them handsomely for their time, and expert witnesses
are, unfortunately and all too frequently, already regarded in some
quarters as little more than hired guns. When expert witnesses can be
forced to defend themselves in federal court beyond the pleading
stage simply for changing their opinions-with no factual allegation
to suggest anything other than an honest change in view based on a
review of new information-we add fuel to this fire. We make candor an expensive option and risk incenting experts to dissemble rather than change their views in the face of compelling new information. The loser in all this is, of course, the truth-finding function and
cause of justice our legal system is designed to serve. oo

95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 1077.
97.
Id. at 1076.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 1077.
100. Id. Additionally, Judge Gorsuch stated that even if the court were to put aside the lack of
factual allegations related to Swerdlow's misconduct, many of the Paces' claims nonetheless lacked
additional essential elements necessary to survive a 12(b)(6) dismissal. For example, the fact that
the Paces never alleged any fear of physical injury as a result of Swerdlow's conduct, but nonetheless asserted a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which, under Utah law, requires an
allegation that the plaintiff feared physical injury or peril as a result of the defendant's negligence.
Id. at 1077-78.
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Ill. ANALYSIS

A. Pace Suggests There are Right and Wrong Ways for Friendly Experts
to Change Their Opinions

In Pace, the Tenth Circuit held that Swerdlow's change of opinion
was not, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of proximate cause.' 0'
However, importantly, Pace does not suggest that any change of opinion
by a friendly expert is sufficient to establish a prima facie proximate
cause link in a negligence suit against the expert. Clearly, the manner in
which Swerdlow changed his opinion influenced the court's decision, as
did his alleged motivations for the change. 0 2 Specifically, Swerdlow
waited a month to announce his change of opinion, 10 3 and his announcement came on the eve of summary judgment via direct fax to opposing
counsel. °4 Further, allegations existed to suggest that the reasons behind
Swerdlow's change of opinion were grounded in fear and intimidation
rather than in a compelling new piece of medical evidence. 0 5 Had
Swerdlow kept the lines of communication open between himself and the
Paces once he began to doubt his earlier testimony, had he not waited
until the eve of the summary judgment hearing to announce his change of
opinion, and, most importantly, had he refrained from faxing his addendum directly to opposing counsel, the court would undoubtedly have had
a more difficult time concluding that his conduct was potentially actionable. 1°6
B. Looking Forward
The decision to recognize a cause-of-action for friendly expert negligence remains a matter of state law, as do the contours of such an action. However, the proximate cause analysis in Pace, having come from
the Tenth Circuit, will likely be regarded as considerable persuasive authority when assessing causation in future claims of friendly expert neg-

101.
Id. at 1074; see also id. at 1075 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
102.
See id. at 1075 ("Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant's change of position,
as well as the timing of that change of position, proximately caused the state court's grant of summary judgment .... ") (emphasis added); see also id. at 1076 ("Dr. Swerdlow changed his opinion,
we are encouraged to surmise, because he feared counsel's 'meanness' and threat to attack Dr.
Swerdlow's medical license.") (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
103.
Id. at 1069, 1071 (Swerdlow's deposition by Dr. Shuput's counsel was on January 4;
however, he did not fax his addendum until February 11).
104.
Id. at 1071.
105.
Id. at 1070; see also id. at 1076 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
106.
Although it is impossible to know what the Tenth Circuit might have done, it is interesting
to note that the Ohio Court of Appeals, in deciding one of the only other claims of friendly expert
negligence ever to turn on a change of opinion by the expert, held, in part, that the expert's change of
opinion was not the cause of the plaintiffs having to prematurely settle their suit because the expert
(1) changed his opinion based on a new piece of medical evidence that had come to his attention, (2)
reported his change of opinion to his hiring party as soon as he made up his mind, and (3) did not
communicate with the opposing party. See Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 857, 860 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990); see also Schaffer v. Donegan, Case No. CA 9108, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5382, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan 21, 1986).
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ligence involving a change of opinion by the expert.1 7 Thus, the ultimate impact of Pace will depend on how the decision is applied in similar cases in jurisdictions that recognize a cause-of-action for friendly
expert negligence. This section argues that Pace, although correctly decided, should be narrowly interpreted and its application restricted to
cases involving only very similar facts.
In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Judge Gorsuch voiced
his concern that the majority's decision may discourage future experts
from changing their testimony even when they encounter new evidence.10 8 However, if Pace is applied narrowly, Judge Gorsuch's slippery-slope scenario seems unlikely to develop. This is because, in Pace,
Swerdlow's conduct was more than merely borderline unreasonable-it
was clearly egregious and reckless. 1 9 In particular, Swerdlow's actions
of waiting a month to notify the Paces of his change of opinion, and faxing his addendum on the eve of summary judgment directly to opposing
counsel without first consulting the Paces or their lawyer, were reckless
by almost any standard. Thus, if restricted to the facts, an argument can
be made that Pace places a very limited burden on future friendly experts
who change their opinions-they need only have genuine motivations for
their change of opinion (such as a compelling new piece of evidence that
has come to light), and to avoid clear negligence in communicating such
a change.
If Pace is applied more broadly, however, Judge Gorsuch's fears
seem more realistic. Much of the danger in a broad application of Pace
arises from the potential risk of lawyers shifting responsibility for their
own negligence or malpractice onto friendly experts. For example, an
argument can be made that an expert who fails to return phone calls or
delays in reviewing relevant case documents, and then suddenly changes
his or her opinion as a hearing or trial approaches, is negligent. However, an additional argument can be made that a lawyer who fails to monitor and replace such an expert is also negligent-and, in some cases, may
be more responsible than the expert. This is because lawyers, not experts, are expected to be familiar with the inner workings of the legal
system, and lawyers, not experts, have a duty of zealous representation to
clients. Thus, it should remain the duty of lawyers to choose their ex107. Interest in Pace is evidenced by the significant amount of coverage the case received from
tort-related media outlets. See, e.g., Robert Ambrogi, Top 10 Expert Witness Cases of 2008, IMS
ExpertServices, http://www.ims-expertservices.com/newsletters/dec/top-10-expert-witness-cases-of2008-120908.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (naming Pace as the third most significant expert witness case of 2008).
108. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1077.
109. Indeed, Swerdlow's conduct was likely sufficiently egregious and reckless to constitute
gross negligence, which under Utah law, is defined as "the failure to observe even slight care; it is
the carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that
may result." Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found. 179 P.3d 760, 767 (Utah 2008) (quoting Berry v.
Greater Park City Co., 171 P.3d 442, 449 (Utah 2007)).
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perts wisely, to guide their experts (no matter how experienced) through
the litigation process, and, if necessary, to replace underperforming experts-even if the experts' behavior might independently be considered
negligent. Therefore, in future claims of friendly expert negligence involving a change of opinion by the expert, the alleged negligence of the
expert in changing his or her opinion should be considered against the
diligence of the lawyer in preparing, guiding, and monitoring the expert.
Only if the negligence of the expert is clearly egregious, and could not
have been reasonably prevented by the lawyer, should the expert's conduct be found potentially actionable.
When applied to the facts in Pace, this proposed test supports the
Tenth Circuit's decision. Swerdlow's total collapse at his deposition by
opposing counsel suggests he was ill-informed and ill-prepared by his
own counsel for the experience. Nonetheless, any lack of diligence in
preparing Swerdlow by the Paces' lawyer was superseded by Swerdlow's own egregious conduct. That is, even if the lawyers were less
than thorough in preparing Swerdlow, and even if they suspected that he
was having doubts following his deposition by opposing counsel, there
was little reason for them to anticipate that he would do something as
reckless as faxing an addendum to opposing counsel, on the eve of summary judgment, without first consulting his hiring party's lawyers.
CONCLUSION

Under a narrow reading of Pace, experts are free to change their
opinions in a case, but (1) must do so based on reasonable new developments in a case (such as compelling new evidence), and (2) must avoid
clear negligence in communicating their change of opinion-an entirely
sensible burden. Thus, if Pace is applied narrowly, no responsible expert
need fear the Tenth Circuit's decision. Further, when evaluating causation in future claims of friendly expert negligence involving a change of
opinion by the expert, courts should consider the alleged negligence of
the expert in changing his or her opinion against any lack of reasonable
diligence or lack of zealous representation by the plaintiffs counsel, and
should require an act of clearly egregious conduct by the expert, which
could not have been reasonably avoided by the lawyer, in order to recognize the change of opinion by the expert as a potential proximate cause.
This test should be conducted both by the judge at the pleading stages
and, if a trial follows, by a jury in the form of jury instructions. Such a
test is desirable because it synthesizes a principle goal of tort law, that of
shifting losses from less responsible to more responsible parties, with
one of the principle tenets of lawyering, that of zealous representation.
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